Notes and Comments by Mathisen, R. H. & Hanson, D. R.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 30 Issue 2 Article 4 
March 1952 
Notes and Comments 
R. H. Mathisen 
D. R. Hanson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
R. H. Mathisen & D. R. Hanson, Notes and Comments, 30 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 142 (1952). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol30/iss2/4 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
NOTES AND COMMENTS
TAKE, THEN PAY; OR PAY, THEN TAKE?
A startling interpretation has been given to Section 13 of Article II
of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, one dealing with the power to con-
demn private property,1 through the holding of the Illinois Supreme
Court in the case of Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Gorbe.'
The original petition therein, filed by a department of the state govern-
ment, sought to condemn certain land for highway purposes. It was
accompanied by a declaration of taking and a deposit of estimated just
compensation pursuant to Section 2a of the Eminent Domain Act,s one
added in 1947. The land owner concerned moved to dismiss, and to en-
join against the taking of the property, on the ground the statute in
question was unconstitutional. These motions were denied and the cause
was reserved for further proceedings to determine the adequacy of the
compensation placed on deposit. On direct appeal from the order denying
the motion to dismiss,4 the Supreme Court held the statute to be in direct
contravention of the state constitution on the ground that that document,
as interpreted, forbade the taking of private property prior to the time
when the precise amount of compensation to be paid had been determined
1 That section of the Bill of Rights declares: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. Such compensation,
when not made by the state, shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall be prescribed
by law." The section also described the quantum of estate which may be con-
demned for railroad purposes.
2 409 Ill. 211, 98 N. E. (2d) 730 (1951). The opinion therein had been prepared by
the late Mr. Justice Wilson as one of his last official acts prior to his death. It
was adopted by the court, which later granted leave to certain amici curiae, who
had participated in the drafting of the so-called Blighted Vacant Area Devel-
opment Act of 1949, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 672, § 91.1 et seq., to present
a petition for rehearing. Rehearing was, however, later denied.
3 Laws 1947, p. 905; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 2a.
4 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court would have been proper, either because a
freehold was involved or because interpretation of the state constitution was
directly concerned, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 199, but for the fact that
the order entered was not of final character. The Eminent Domain Act provides,
however, that an order denying a motion to strike a declaration of taking shall
constitute an appealable order: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 12. It is
worthy of note that, by the last mentioned statute, the appeal must be taken with-
in thirty days from the date of the order. The court, on a showing of excusable
delay, granted a petition for leave to appeal filed within fourteen months: Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 200. There is doubt whether the provisions of
the Civil Practice Act mentioned would be applicable to eminent domain pro-
ceedings, ibid., Ch. 110, § 125, but the brief in support of the petition for rehearing,
pages 30-3, notes that the appellants had filed notice of appeal and bond within
the thirty-day period, hence jurisdictional requirements were met in apt time. The
court, beyond noting the facts mentioned, expressed no comment on this subordinate
point.
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by an appropriate tribunal and such compensation had, in fact, been paid.
By so determining, the court not only struck down the statutory provi-
sion in question but also cast doubt on the validity of every attempt to
adopt the principle of quick-taking in this state.
The inherent power to condemn property for public use is an aspect
of sovereignty which needs no constitutional foundation for its exercise.
In the interest of public welfare, such power, or its exercise, should not
be trammelled beyond the limit of restraints which the public, as ultimate
sovereign, may see fit to impose for the protection of the individual prop-
erty owner. As the latter ought not be forced to bear alone the expense
of a public improvement, it is not remarkable that practically every
American constitution, 5 state as well as federal, conditions the exercise of
the eminent domain power by guaranteeing the payment of just compen-
sation for all property taken. The question propounded in the Gorbe
case, as in all others like it, is narrowed to one concerning the time when
payment must be made, whether prior to, simultaneously with, or suc-
ceeding the taking.
While each of the three Illinois constitutions have guaranteed that
payment would be made to the property owner of just compensation for
the property taken from him, no one of these constitutions, by express
language, has fixed any period of time within which payment should be
made. Early Illinois courts interpreted this fact, in cases arising under
the 1848 Constitution, so as not to make payment of compensation a
condition precedent to a taking of property,6 but the issue has not been
quite so clear since the adoption of the Constitution of 1870. That docu-
ment produced two major changes in the general field; one which required
the payment of compensation when property was merely damaged, rather
than taken; the other, by prescribing that compensation, when not to be
made by the State, should be ascertained by a jury.
7
Within one year after the adoption of the last-mentioned constitution,
5 The constitutions of New Hampshire and North Carolina appear to be the only
ones silent on the question of the right to just compensation.
6 In Johnson v. Joliet & Chicago R. R. Co., 23 Ill. 124 (1859), at p. 131, the
court noted that some constitutions, by precise language, required that compensa-
tion should precede taking, but that the Illinois Constitution of 1848 was not one of
them: Ill. Const. 1848, Art. XIII, § 11. The same statement would have been true
as to the first state constitution: Ill. Const. 1818, Art. VIII, § 11. In People ex rel.
South Park Commissioners v. Williams, 51 Il1. 63 (1869), the court appeared to
have confused constitutional with statutory language. It returned to the original
view in the case of Cook v. South Park Commissioners, 61 Ill. 115 (1871), and
refused to disturb the state of the law when, in Townsend v. Chicago & Alton R. R.
Co., 91 Ill. 545 (1879), decided nine years after the 1848 Constitution had been
superseded but in a case based on that constitution, it sustained proceedings for
the taking of land before payment had been made.
7 See Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13. The provision also, for the first time, limited
the nature of the estate which could be condemned for railroad purposes.
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the Illinois Supreme Court was called upon to construe the current
limitation in the case of People ex rel. Decatur & State Line Railway
Company v. McRoberts.8 Actually, the question propounded was one as
to whether or not, in private condemnation proceedings, the trial judge
should be ordered, by writ of mandamus, to appoint commissioners to
fix the property value, the method previously followed, or should submit
the issue to a jury trial. In the course of its opinion, however, the court
saw fit to express its belief as to the new procedure to be followed by
saying: "The compensation for property damaged as well as taken, must
be ascertained by a jury. It can neither be damaged nor taken without
compensation; and it follows, as a necessary sequence, that there can be
no entrance upon, or possession of, land for public use, until compensation
for land damaged, as well as taken, has been paid.'' Later cases, without
critical evaluation of the holding or of the language of the McRoberts
case, have added strength to the principle that there' can be no taking
before payment,10 but in only three instances, prior to the present one,
was any issue in fact made regarding the time when compensation had to
be made.
The first real consideration of the point came in the case of Caldwell
v. Highway Commissioners," an action to restrain the opening of a road
across plaintiff's land until payment had been made for the right of way.
The suit was defended on the ground that plaintiff had been tendered
payment in the form of certain non-interest bearing orders payable out of
a tax to be levied and collected in the future. The court seemingly con-
sidered the security of the land owner in the ultimate collection of his
compensation as being important. In that regard, it said: "Courts have
held that where no time is specified for payment and the State under-
takes the payment of compensation, it is not necessary that the payment
should precede the use of the property, and perhaps that doctrine is sus-
tainable on the ground that the public faith is of such a character and
so pledged to the performance of the obligations of the State as to amount
to payment."12 With reference to the case before it, however, it declared
there was "no good ground for extending such a rule to towns and local
municipalities for whose obligations the State assumes no liability."
8 62 Ill. 38 (1871).
9 62 Ill. 38 at 43. Italics added. That such statement was obiter dictum is not
open to doubt.
10 City of Chicago v. McCausland, 379 Ill. 602, 41 N. E. (2d) 745 (1942) ; People
ex rel. O'Meara v. Smith, 374 Ill. 286, 29 N. E. (2d) 274 (1940) ; South Park Com-
missioners v. Dunlevy, 91 Ill. 49 (1878); City of Chicago v. Barbian, 80 Ill. 482
(1875) ; Mitchell v. I. & St. L. R. R. & C. Co., 68 Ill. 286 (1873). It should be
noted that these cases all concerned activity by lesser political subdivisions of the
state or by private corporations.
11 249 Ill. 366, 94 N. E. 490 (1911).
12 249 Ill. 366 at 373, 94 N. E. 490 at 493.
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The case of Moore v. Gar Creek Drainage District3 also turned on
the failure of the public agency to furnish the land owner with security
adequate to guarantee payment of the amount eventually to be fixed as
just compensation. In the most recent of the three decisions prior to the
one in the Gorbe case, that announced in the case of People ex rel. Hester-
man v. Smart," there would seem to be a basis for an inference that, if
the state were to furnish adequate security for payment of compensation,
legislative adoption of the quick-taking principle might have been sus-
tained.
Explanation for certain of the holdings under the 1870 Constitution
might well lie on the foundation that, except as to the state government,
the property owner has no adequate assurance, other than by withholding
his property, that the local municipal or private corporation exercising
the power of eminent domain will pay compensation. Further regard for
the property owner's welfare would seem evidenced, again except as to
the state government, in the mandatory requirement that the amount of
compensation "shall be ascertained by a jury" as prescribed by law."6
These reasonable precautions might well bespeak an application of the
principle of no taking before compensation to lesser governmental units,
even in the absence of constitutional mandate on the point. Does it follow,
however, that the same arguments prevail against the state government
itself ?
When the present constitutional provision was under consideration
in 1870, four different resolutions were offered to the constitutional con-
vention, three of which proposed to require that compensation should be
fixed and be paid before the taking of property occurred. 16 Without ac-
cepting the phraseology of either of these suggestions, the Bill of Rights
Committee, to which committee these resolutions had been referred, re-
ported a recommendation for the passage of a provision identical with
the present Section 13 of Article II of the 1870 Constitution. 17 Most of
Is 266 i. 339, 107 N. E. 642 (1915).
14333 Ill. 135, 164 N. E. 171 (1928).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, §§ 7, 8 and 9, deal with jury trial in
eminent domain proceedings.
16 See Debates and Proceedings, Ill. Const. Cony. 1870, Vol. 1, pp. 88, 93, 155 and
858. The resolution of Charles Wheaton, offered December 20, 1869, among other
things, declared that "in all other cases whatever . . . a compensation there-
for shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money." Ibid.,
Vol. 1, p. 88. That of John C. Haines, offered on January 10, 1870, was to the
effect that "private property shall not be taken or applied to public use without
the value thereof shall be first ascertained by a jury, and compensation therefor is
first made in money." Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 155. The resolution of Henry J. Atkins,
offered February 25, 1870, called for "Just compensation therefor being first made to
the owner of the same, to be determined by a jury in all cases." Ibid., Vol. 1,
p. 858. The fourth resolution was intended to deal solely with the appropriation of
property to the use of private corporations: Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 93.
17 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1440.
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the debate over this recommendation turned on the question as to whether
or not the requirement as to jury trial should not also be made mandatory
in state cases. Certain of the speakers, who must presumably have re-
flected the sentiment of the convention, when discussing this issue, touched
on the desirability of the state being able to act without the delay which
would be caused by requiring it to submit first to trial by jury. 8 In fact,
the speaker most concerned with requiring that all determinations regard-
ing compensation be made by a jury expressed the belief that it was not
the "question of the time when the property shall be taken, but the
question as to how much shall be paid for it, that should be submitted to
the jury."' 9  Another proponent for a motion to amend the proposed
section, Mr. Turner of Stephenson County, admitted that there was nothing
in the section which would require that compensation be paid first. It
would, according to him, be "sufficient if it is paid afterwards."
20
The failure to produce an amendment to the proposed section, to-
gether with its subsequent approval as submitted, would certainly tend to
indicate that it was the sense of the convention that, so far as the state
government was concerned, its only obligation was to pay just compen-
sation, as determined by law, but without any other limitation on its
sovereign power to condemn. If further limitation was essential, such as
one requiring that payment should precede taking, would not there have
been some expression on the point, particularly in view of the text of the
resolutions offered to the convention? In fact, does not the lack of any
such additional limitation argue against the decision reached in the Gorbe
case?
While specific limitations making payment of compensation a condi-
tion precedent do exist in eleven of the state constitutions, 21 certain others
of them either do no more than impose a requirement for a security
deposit 22 or permit of an alternative between payment or deposit.23 Seven-
18 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1580. Mr. Church, McHenry County, voiced the opinion that
if jury trial became a condition precedent to state takings, the state "could not
even preserve its own existence." It would, he said, be "embarrassed in pro-
curing a military camp for its soldiers in suppressing rebellion."
19 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1580. Remarks by Mr. Buxton. Italics added.
20 Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 1581.
21 Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 23; Ga. Const. 1877, Art. I, § 3 (1) ; Ida. Const. 1890,
Art. I, § 14; Ind. Const. 1851, Art. I, § 21; Ky. Const. 1891, § 13; La. Const. 1921,
Art. I, § 2; Md. Const. 1867, Art. III, § 40; Miss. Const. 1890, Art. III, § 17; Ore.
Const. 1859, Art. I, § 18; So. Car. Const. 1895, Art. I, § 17; So. Dak. Const. 1889,
Art. VI, § 13. Both the Indiana and the Oregon constitutions except the state
from the requirement that the compensation shall be first "assessed and tendered."
22 Mich. Const. 1909, Art. XIII, § 1, indicates that the just compensation shall
be "first made or secured in such manner as shall be prescribed by law."
23 See Ariz. Const. 1912, Art. II, § 17; Cal. Const. 1879, Art. I, § 14; Colo. Const.
1876, Art. II, § 13; Fla. Const. 1887, Art. XVI, § 29; Iowa Const. 1857, Art. I,
§ 18; Kas. Const. 1861, Art. XII, § 4; Minn. Const. 1857, Art. I, § 13; Mo. Const.
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teen states, including Illinois, by contrast, have done little more than
model their eminent domain provisions along the line of the classic word-
ing to be found in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, which simply reads: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation. ''2 Not one court, other than the
Illinois Supreme Court, in these last mentioned jurisdictions has inter-
preted this fundamental guarantee so as to deny, on constitutional grounds,
the right of the condemnor to take possession before payment has been
made. Not only has the federal Declaration of Taking Act 25 been held to
be valid,26 but similar state views have been approved by the United States
Supreme Court when challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment,
27
provided there has been assurance that the property owner would receive
the amount due for just compensation when the same was subsequently
ascertained. In that regard, a pledge of the "public faith" has been
deemed to be sufficient to support action by the federal or state govern-
ment,28 although it may not be enough as to lesser governmental units.29
In the light of these holdings, it is difficult to see wherein Section 2a
of the Eminent Domain Act 0 is, or could be, unconstitutional as applied
to the state government. It is limited, in its operation, to the taking of
private property by, or in the name of, the State of Illinois. It requires
the deposit, in court, of the full amount of the estimated just compensation
1875, Art. II, § 21; Mont. Const. 1889, Art. III, § 14; Nev. Const. 1864, Art. I,
§ 8; No. flak. Const. 1889, Art. I, § 14; Ohio Const. 1851, Art. II, § 19; Okla.
Const. 1907, Art. II, § 24; Pa. Const. 1874, Art. I, § 10; Tex. Const. 1876, Art. I,
§ 17; Wash. Const. 1889, Art. I, § 16; West Va. Const. 1872, Art. III, § 9. The
Nevada provision excuses the necessity for payment or security "in cases of war,
riot, fire, or great public peril," permitting compensation in such instances to be
made at a later time. It is the only one which gives any attention to the
necessity of acting promptly in an emergency.
24 Ark. Const. 1874, Art. II, § 22; Conn. Const. 1818, Art. I, § 11; Dela. Const.
1897, Art. I, § 8; Il. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 13; Me. Const. 1820-76, Art. I, § 21;
Mass. Const. 1790, Part I, Art. X; Neb. Const. 1875, Art. III, § 21; New Jers. Const.
1844, Art. I, § 16; New Mex. Const. 1912, Art. II, § 20; New York Const. 1895,
Art. I, § 7; R. I. Const. 1843, Art. I, § 16; Tenn. Const. 1870, Art. I, § 21; Utah
Const. 1895, Art. I, § 22; Vt. Const. 1793, Ch. 1, Art. 2; Va. Const. 1902, Art. I, § 6,
and Art. IV, § 58; Wis. Const. 1848, Art. I, § 13; Wyo. Const. 1889, Art. I, §§ 32-3.
The Arkansas provision is supplemented by Ark. Const. 1874, Art. XII, § 9, which
directs that no property "shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation"
until full compensation has been made or secured by a deposit of money.
2540 U. S. C. A. § 258a.
26 City of Oakland v. United States, 124 F. (2d) 959 (1942), cert. den. 316 U. S.
679, 62 S. Ct. 1106, 86 L. Ed. 1753 (1942).
27 Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U. S. 57, 40 S. Ct. 62, 64 L. Ed. 135 (1919) ; Williams
v. Parker, 188 U. S. 491, 23 S. Ct. 440, 47 L. Ed. 559 (1903) ; A. Backus, Jr., & Sons
v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 S. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853 (1898);
Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 16 S. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188 (1895).
25 Crozier v. Pried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U. S. 290, 32 S. Ct. 488, 56
L. Ed. 771 (1912).
29 Caldwell v. Highway Commissioners, 249 Ill. 366, 94 N. E. 490 (1911).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 47, § 2a.
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before taking is to occur. It permits the property owner to withdraw
such deposit promptly without prejudice to the further right to question
the adequacy of the compensation. It authorizes the court to enter judg-
ment against the state in the event the sum of just compensation is ulti-
mately decided to be in excess of the amount deposited. It authorizes
appeal to the highest court in the state. It even provides for the return
of the property, with damages, in the event it be later determined that
the taking was not for a proper public use. All in all, there would seem
to be ample protection under the statute for even the most captious prop-
erty owner.31 Nevertheless, the statute has now been stricken down under
circumstances which would tend to indicate that no amount of legislative
legerdemain could ever revive it, not even in altered form.
The matter has now become but a further illustration of the need for
extensive constitutional revision. It is unthinkable that a sovereign state
should be denied the power, in the gravest moment of emergency, to act
promptly to protect itself and all of its citizens; that it should be required
to wait out the law's delays before taking over what might be the very
thing needed to preserve all of society. If Illinois is to remain so dis-
abled, it would be a second-class state indeed.
R. H. MATHISEN
THE VALIDITY OF "NOT FOR PROFIT" LOTTERIES
Mankind has pondered for many centuries over the problem as to
whether criminal acts become lawful if done from pure motives. That
problem has again been brought to the forefront by an Ohio nisi prius
decision in the case of Jamestown Lions Club v. Smith.' The plaintiff
there, an association which admittedly expended its funds for charitable
purposes and public benefit causes, sought a declaratory judgment to the
effect that its conduct in the operation of bingo and similar games of
chance, to raise funds to support its charities, was not subject to order
31 If any criticism at all could be addressed to the fairness of the statute, it
might arise from the fact that there is no provision for the payment of interest
on any deficiency In the amount of the deposit for the period between the time
of taking and the date of the judgment as to such deficiency. Interest for a delay
in payment after judgment would be covered by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Oh. 74,
§ 3. It is doubted that Section 2 thereof, dealing with interest on money claims,
would be applicable to the interim period as it is unlikely that a court would
find an "unreasonable and vexatious delay" in making up the deficiency. The
court, in the Gorbe case, made no point in this connection, being content to base
its decision solely on the interpretation given to the constitutional phraseology.
Framers of any future statute might wish to keep this point in mind for, to the
extent of the deficiency, the condemnor has had the use of another's property
without making payment, either in the form of rent for the land or interest for the
use of the money.
1 100 N. E. (2d) 540 (Ohio Com. Pl., 1951).
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of discontinuance at the command of the local sheriff and prosecutor,
backed up with a threat of prosecution for violation of law.
It appeared that a provision of the Ohio Constitution declared that
lotteries, and the sale of lottery tickets, "for any purpose whatever, shall
forever be prohibited in this state," 2 but that an Ohio statute penalizing
the offense of operating a lottery was presently directed only at a person
who "for his own profit" operated such a gambling scheme.3 On the basis
of that statute, the nisi prius judge declared that it was the right of the
plaintiff to operate as it did and directed the public officials to cease their
interference. 4 He purported to find justification for that holding on the
basis that the statute in question had been declared constitutional in the
case of State v. Parker,' but it is doubted if that case,' or the general law
on the subject, will support that view.
Approaching the subject of the non-commercial operation of lotteries
from the constitutional standpoint, it may first be noted that thirty-seven
states have constitutional provisions dealing with the subjects of lotteries
and gambling.' The mere presence of such provisions, however, is not
2 Ohio Const. 1851, Art. 15, § 6.
3 Ohio Gen. Code, § 13064. The statute had originally been all-inclusive. It was
amended, on September 21, 1943, by inserting the phrase "for his own profit," so
as to make the statute now read: "Whoever, for his own profit, establishes . . .
a lottery or scheme of chance, by whatever name, style or title denominated or
known . . . shall be fined . . . and imprisoned not less than ten days nor more
than six months."
4 The judge, In passing, remarked that "when bingo and other games of chance
are conducted by clubs, lodges, societies or churches for the benefit of charitable
purposes and public benefit causes, they do no harm; in fact, they may do a
great deal of good; and if some of the people who are so exercised in stopping
church bingo games were as much exercised in bringing peace to the world they
might accomplish something." See 100 N. E. (2d) 540 at 542. Others would not
appear to agree. See, in particular, Stevenson, "Home Rule on the Run," 40 Ill.
B. J. 154 (1951), particularly 157, and see also In re Wall, 407 Ill. 484, 95 N. E.
(2d) 375 (1950), where a state's attorney was suspended from practice for toler-
ating gambling in his county.
5 150 Ohio St. 22, 80 N. E. (2d) 490 (1948).
6The case actually involved the validity of an indictment, against a demurrer
by a defendant, which failed to charge that defendant came within the proviso of
the statute. As to the necessity of so pleading, see People ex rel. Courtney v.
Prystalski, 358 Ill. 198, 192 N. E. 908 (1934).
7 Ala. Const. 1901, Art. 4, § 65; Ark. Const. 1874, Art. 19, § 14; Cal. Const. 1879,
Art. 4, § 26; Colo. Const. 1876, Art. 18, § 2; Dela. Const. 1897, Art. 2, § 17; Fla.
Const. 1887, Art. 3, § 23; Ga. Const. 1877, Art. 1, § 2(4) ; Ida. Const. 1890, Art. 3,
§ 20; Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 4, § 27; Ind. Const. 1851, Art. 15, § 8; Iowa Const.
1857, Art. 3, § 28; Kan. Const. 1861, Art. 15, § 3; Ky. Const. 1891, § 226; La. Const.
1921, Art. 19, § 8; Md. Const. 1867, Art. 3, § 36; Mich. Const. 1909, Art. 5, § 33;
Minn. Const. 1857, Art. 4, § 31; Miss. Const. 1890, Art. 4, § 98; Mo. Const. 1875,
Art. 14, § 10; Mont. Const. 1889, Art. 19, § 2; Neb. Const. 1875, Art. 3, § 24; Nev.
Const. 1864, Art. 4, § 24; N. J. Const. 1844, Art. 4, § 7(2); N. Y. Const. 1895, Art.
1, § 9; N. D. Const. 1889, Art. 2, § 70a; Ohio Const. 1851, Art. 15, § 6; Ore. Const.
1859, Art. 15, § 4; R. I. Const. 1843, Art. 4, § 12; S. C. Const. 1895, Art. 17, § 7;
S. D. Const. 1889, Art. 3, § 25; Tenn. Const. 1870, Art. 11, § 5; Tex. Const. 1876,
Art. 3, § 47; Utah Const. 1895, Art. 6, § 28; Va. Const. 1902, Art. 4, § 60; Wash.
Const. 1889, Art. 2, § 24; W. Va. Const 1872, Art. 6, § 36; Wis. Const. 1848, Art. 4,
§24.
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always enough since many of them are not self-executing although they
do enunciate a fundamental public policy on the point. Many of these
provisions require the passage of implementing legislation, as is true in
Ohio, while others operate simply to deprive the legislature of the power
to authorize lotteries and the like." Certainly, any law passed in violation
of a prohibition of the type last mentioned would be clearly invalid. One
passed in furtherance of the first type would, all other requirements being
observed, be not only constitutional but evidence of a desire on the part
of the legislature to obey the command placed on them by the people.
If the passage of additional legislation is necessary but not forthcoming,
there is little that a court could do to compel action by the legislature for
it is well understood that a writ of mandamus would not lie in such a
situation." It is when the legislature, pursuant to the command, has
acted, either in full or partly so, that questions of judicial cognizance can
arise. Such is the Ohio situation.
The court in the instant case, having observed that the provision in
the Ohio Constitution was not self-executing, then considered whether the
legislature had acted to provide, by law, for its implementation. In that
regard, it indicated that the statute in question was not one which pur-
ported to authorize the operation of a lottery, for that would clearly be
unconstitutional, but rather was one under which the legislature had
selected only one class of persons, to-wit: "commercial" gamblers, for
punishment without providing any regulation whatever applicable to
other classes. On that score, the statute was said to be inapplicable to the
case before the court.1  That reasoning is faulty in two respects. It is
first open to objection on the ground of its negative approach. The legis-
lature, by condemning the acts of but a few, could well be said, tacitly
at least, to be approving the same acts when done by others so as, in fact,
to be authorizing certain, if not all, lottery operations. In the second
place, the reasoning does not square with that constitutional doctrine
which declares that laws creating different classes of persons for varying
8 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 4, § 27, is two-fold in character. It declares that the
"general assembly shall have no power to authorize lotteries or gift enterprises
for any purpose, and shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enter-
prise tickets in this State."
9 There is no doubt that the original Ohio statute, prior to its amendment, was
of that character.
10 Greenwood Cemetery Land Co. v. Roult, 17 Colo. 156, 28 P. 1125, 15 L. R. A.
369, 31 Am. St. Rep. 284 (1892); Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 10, 152 N. E. 557, 46
A. L. R. 960 (1926); People ex rel. Billings v. Bissell, 19 Ill. 229, 69 Am. Dec.
591 (1857).
"In State v. Lloyd, 16 Ohio Supp. 15 (1944), the court was asked to pass on
the question of the unreasonableness of the classification but did not as the de-
fendant was charged under another section held to be severable from the section
here under discussion.
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purposes are to be deemed valid only provided the classification schemes
found therein are based on reasonable grounds. 2
Certainly, if any legislative purpose is evident in the Ohio statute,
it was to draw a distinction between commercialized lotteries on the one
hand and those operated for charitable, or not for profit, purposes on the
other. It has been said, however, that that very form of distinction, i.e.
one classifying lotteries on the basis of whether or not they are to be
operated for charitable purposes, is one of unreasonable character, hence
unconstitutional." One can only conclude, therefore, that the Ohio court
was clearly wrong in attaining the result it did, for it would have no
right, in the face of constitutional condemnation of lotteries "for any
purpose whatever," to determine whether some lotteries might be socially
desirable. 4
Of more concern is the state of the law on the point in Illinois. The
constitutional provision in this state not only denies to the legislature the
power to authorize lotteries but is emphatic on the point that the legis-
lature "shall pass laws to prohibit the sale of lottery or gift enterprise
tickets in this State. '"" There has been no occasion for any Illinois re-
viewing court to provide interpretation for this provision or to settle the
question as to whether it is self-executing or not, but if persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions were to be accepted, it would probably
be held not to be self-executing for provisions containing similar verbiage
elsewhere have been so construed. 6 For that matter, general principles
of constitutional construction17 should lead to that result as it is clear
that the section is not complete as it makes no rules for its enforcement
nor does it fix the nature of the punishment to be imposed on violators. 18
12 United States v. Burnison, 339 U. S. 87, 70 S. Ct. 503, 94 L. Ed. 675 (1950) ;
People ex rel. Curran v. Wood, 391 Ill. 237, 62 N. E. (2d) 809, 161 A. L. R. 718
(1945); State v. Norval Hotel Co., 103 Ohio St. 361, 133 N. E. 75, 19 A. L. R.
637 (1921).
13 Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash. 38, 52 P. 334 (1898) ; State ex rel. Trampe v.
Multerer, 234 Wis. 50, 289 N. W. 600 (1940).
14 An interesting statement relating to a constitutional prohibition against both
lottery and gambling may be found in People ex rel. Sturgis v. Fallon, 152 N. Y. 1
at 11, 46 N. E. 302 at 305, 37 L. R. A. 419 at 422 (1897). Pointing to the extent
of the power of the legislature to render the ban harmless by discriminatory legis-
lation, the court said: "While, under that provision, the legislature would have
no power to enact laws permitting those offenses, or which in terms protected
persons guilty of them from punishment, yet where . . . the act is forbidden
by the legislature . . . the determination of the degree of punishment or the
extent of the penalty is vested in the legislature and not in the courts." Italics
added.
15 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 4, § 27.
16 State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 882, 94 So. 408 (1922) State v. Fox-Great Falls
Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P. (2d) 689 (1942); Beach v. Queens County
Jockey Club, 164 Misc. 363, 298 N. Y. S. 777 (1937).
1716 C. J. S., Constitutional Law, § 48, p. 96.
Is Cooley, Const. Lim., Vol. 1, p. 167.
151
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
It is, moreover, addressed to the legislative rather than to the judicial
department, being placed in the article dealing with the former."
Assuming, for the moment, that the Illinois provision is not self-
executing, 20 it is necessary to see what the legislature may have done to
provide reinforcement. Adequate legislation presently exists on the sub-
ject"' and, unlike the Ohio statute in question, there is, at the moment,
nothing in the statute indicating any design to draw any distinction
between "commercialized" lotteries and those operated for charitable
purposes. It is not urged that any such distinction should be drawn. In
fact, as indicated above, it is not believed one could be made in constitu-
tional fashion.22 But there has been agitation for the non-enforcement of
law against "charity" gambling schemes, when conducted by churches,
lodges, veterans' organizations and the like, in contrast to the agitation
for law enforcement against "syndicate" or commercialized gambling.
2
That very agitation may induce the legislature to consider the enactment
of some form of amendment, or complete abolition of all statute law, on
the subject. If it should so contemplate, it should remember that tke
social evil inherent in lotteries, provocative of the constitutional ban, is
not in any way diminished by reason of the fact that the nickels and dimes
of the poor are channelled into "charitable" pockets instead of into those
belonging to persons who operate such schemes for profit. A lottery is
still an objectionable form of gambling, no matter by whom operated.
If the legislature, by repeal, should think fit to deprive the state of
the protection of police measures on the subject, the courts would be
powerless, by mandamus, to compel legislative respect for the mandate to
be found in the Illinois Constitution. 4 Courts would not, however, be
without power to suppress the evil for courts of equity could act to enjoin
the conduct of lotteries on the ground they amounted to public nuisances. 25
Nuisances of that character violate the public right "by a direct en-
19 It has been suggested that one test, by which to determine if a constitutional
provision is, or is not, self-executing, is its location in the fundamental document;
State v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre Corp., 114 Mont. 52, 132 P. (2d) 689 (1942);
Broderick v. Weinsier, 161 Misc. 820, 293 N. Y. S. 889 (1937).
20 Even if it be not self-executing, it is also the rule that a prohibitory provision
is sufficiently self-executing that anything done in violation of It is void: Wash-
ingtonian Home of Chicago v. Chicago, 157 Ill. 414, 41 N. E. 893, 29 L. R. A. 798
(1895) ; Wren v. Dixon, 40 Nev. 170, 161 P. 722 (1916).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 406-414.
22 See cases cited in note 13, ante.
23 See, for example, Baker, "Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime," 29 CinomoO-
KENT LAW REviEw 197-227 (1951).
24 See cases cited in note 10, ante.
25 For a discussion of the power of a court of equity to enjoin gambling as a
public nuisance, see Baker, "An Equitable Remedy to Combat Gambling in
Illinois, 28 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEW 287-303 (1950).
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croachment . . . or by doing some act which tends to a common injury. "26
Without question, a lottery would be a public nuisance for, as the United
States Supreme Court once said, it "infests the whole community; it
enters every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earn-
ings of the poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple. "27 There would,
then, be inherent power in an equity court to protect the community from
such a scourge,2 8 particularly in view of the public policy enunciated in
the constitution.21 It is unlikely, therefore, that the state would be with-
out protection of a sort. It would, however, be better if the legislature
gave no heed to requests for the drawing of invidious distinctions but
left the present statute unchanged.
There is occasion to notice, while on the subject of lotteries, that the
ban in the Illinois Constitution is restricted in character and does not
forbid all types of gambling. At present, another Illinois statute makes
it criminal to engage in other forms of gambling transactions, such as
betting on cards, dice or billiard games, through the sale of grain futures,
by wagers or pools on athletic contests, by means of bucket-shop opera-
tions, through the use of slot or similar machines, and the like.30 It has
been said, with regard to such operations, that the "whole subject of
gaming is under legislative control in the exercise of the police power,
which gives control over those things which may be injurious to the public
welfare."'" Such being the case, there is the possibility that the legis-
lature, possessed of the power to exercise, or refrain from exercising, the
police authority, may see fit to repeal or to amend existing laws in that
area so as to permit of some forms of gambling operations by favored
classes of persons while prohibiting them as to others.
32
26 Chicago v. Shaynin, 258 Ill. 69 at 71, 101 N. E. 224 at 225, 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 23 (1913).
27 Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U. S. (8 How.) 163 at 168, 12 L. Ed. 1030 at 1033 (1850).
28 Legislative definition of those acts which constitute public nuisances, as for
example in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 466, does not exclude the possibility
of there being common law nuisances not enumerated therein: People ex rel. Dyer
v. Clark, 268 Ill. 156, 108 N. E. 994, Ann. Cas. 1916D 785 (1915).
29 See, for example, Iris Amusement Corp. v. Kelly, 366 Ill. 256 at 261, 8 N. E.
(2d) 648 at 650 (1937) ; Jones v. Smith Oil Co., 295 Ill. App. 519, 15 N. E. (2d)
42 (1938).
30111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, §§ 324-348.
81 Pelouze v. Slaughter, 241 Ill. 215 at 227, 89 N. E. 259 at 263 (1909).
32 It has, in fact, done so in the case of pari-mutuel betting on horse races,
under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 8, § 37a et seq., and as to harness racing,
Ibid., Ch. 38, § 37s et seq. The constitutionality thereof has been approved in
People v. Monroe, 349 I1. 270, 182 N. E. 439, 85 A. L. R. 605 (1932). For cases
from other jurisdictions reaching similar results, see Lee v. City of Miami, 121
Fla. 93, 163 So. 486, 101 A. L. R. 1115 (1935); Commonwealth v. Kentucky Jockey
Club, 292 Ky. 531, 38 S. W. (2d) 987 (1931); Utah State Fair Ass'n v. Green, 68
Utah 251, 249 P. 1016 (1926).
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Except as such amendments might be stricken down because of un-
reasonableness in the scheme of classification, the people of the state would
seem to have left themselves unprotected against legislation of that char-
acter at the hands of a legislature so inclined. It goes without saying that
if a lottery is a social evil, no matter by whom conducted, then othei
forms of gambling are no less of a social evil, for what is inherently bad
in the one is no less so in the other. Against the possibility that the people
of Illinois have protected themselves only by halves, there would seem to
be urgent need to revise the constitutional provision so as to turn it into
a total ban on all forms of gambling.
D. R. HANsoN
